Abstract. We show that a criterion for eligibility of a candidate by the set of de Borda's voting rules in [H. Moulin (1988) Axioms of cooperative decision making] is erroneous and we obtain the correct version of this criterion. Let r(a i ) be the score vector of a candidate a i , R be the set of all vectors r(a i ), and let R ′ be the Pareto boundary of the convex hull conv R. Then there is a scoring s such that a candidate a wins with respect to the de Borda voting rule β s if and only if r(a) ∈ R ′ .
Introduction. Suppose the set A of candidates and the profile u of the voters' preferences are fixed. Let s be a system of scores and β s be the de Borda rule assigned to s. Further, let β s (u) ⊂ A be the set of winners w.r.t. this rule. A candidate a ∈ A is eligible w.r.t. the set of de Borda's rules β s if there is a scoring s such that a ∈ β s (u). The book [1] suggests the following criterion for eligibility of a given candidate a w.r.t. the set of de Borda's rules: a winner a has the score vector r(a) that belongs to the Pareto boundary of the set R = {r(a j ), a j ∈ A}; see pages 2 -3 for rigorous definitions.
Unfortunately, the criterion in this formulation is incorrect. On page 5 we give a counter-example using the profile u defined in Eq. (1) .
In Theorems 2 and 3 below we prove the correct version of this eligibility criterion. The difference between the correct statement and the erroneous one contained in [1] is that the Pareto boundary of the convex hull conv R must be used instead of the Pareto boundary of the set R itself, here R is the set of all score vectors.
1. Definitions 1.1. Profiles. Let P 1 , . . . , P n be electors (or voters) and A = {a 1 ; . . . ; a p } be the set of candidates in some elections. Suppose that every elector P i has an opinion about each candidate such that the candidates are arranged by the strict order > i : the first candidate in this rearrangement is the most favourable for P i , etc. This strict linear order > i on A is called the preference of the elector P i and is denoted by u i . The order u i is given by the sequence
where J = (j 1 ; j 2 ; . . . ; j p ) is a rearrangement of (1; 2; . . . ; p); generally, J depends on the elector P i .
In what follows, we write down the elements of the preferences u i in columns and thus we compose the matrix
This matrix is the profile of preferences of the voters. Let us denote by L(A) the set of all strict linear orders on A. Then the profiles u are elements of the space of preferences L = (L(A)) n . Suppose that several voters have coinciding preferences u i , and assume that the order of electors is not important for the voting rules. Then we write down the coinciding columns only once and indicate the respective number of electors in the upper line of the matrix u, e. g., 
Notation (1) 
The vector s is a system of scores, or a scoring. Then, each candidate a ∈ A obtains s 0 points for the last place in the preference of a voter, s 1 points for the last but one place, s 2 points for the third place from the bottom, etc.; clearly, s p−1 points are obtained for the top position. The points accumulated by a candidate a from all the voters are summed, and this sum B s (a) is called the de Borda estimate of the candidate a w.r.t. the scoring s, or, briefly, the s-estimate for a. The de Borda voting rule β s with the scoring s says that the candidates a ∈ A who have the maximal sum B s (a) of points are the winners of these elections. Note that the winner may be not unique if two or more candidates a, b, . . . obtain equal (maximal) estimates B s (a) = B s (b) = . . . . We denote by β s (u) the set of all winners with respect to the profile u.
Example 1. The standard de Borda voting rule is based on the system of scores s = (0; 1; 2; . . . ; p − 1): a candidate obtains 0 points for the last place, 1 point for the last but one place, etc.; a candidate obtains p−1 points for the first place. The rule suggests that the winner has the maximal sum of points from all voters. The plurality voting rule is also a generalized de Borda's rule. The rule corresponds to the scoring s with s 0 = 0, s 1 = 0, . . . , s p−2 = 0, s p−1 = 1. Therefore the sum B s (a) consists of m units if a is the preferable candidate for m voters; hence the winner by the rule β s receives the plurality in the preferences of the voters.
The antiplurality voting rule is another generalized de Borda's rule. It corresponds to the scoring s such that s 0 = −1, s 1 = 0, s 2 = 0, . . . , s p−1 = 0. The candidate who wins by the rule β s has the least number of the last places in the preferences of the electors.
Remark 1. Let β s be a de Borda's voting rule with the scoring s = (s 0 ; s 1 ; . . . ; s p−1 ). If a constant d is added to each score s k , k = 0, . . . , p − 1, then we get the new rule β s ′ with s ′ such that s
Hence all the estimates B s (a) change to B s ′ (a) = B s (a) + nd, that is, they acquire the addend nd, which does not depend on a candidate a. Obviously, the sets of winners by the two rules β s and β s ′ coincide: β s ′ (u) = β s (u) for any profile u. Consequently, the scorings s and s ′ define the same voting rule: β s ′ = β s . If we set d = −s 0 , then we have s ′ 0 = 0. Therefore we can set s 0 = 0 for the de Borda rule assigned to any scoring s whenever that is convenient.
Definition 3. Let F ⊂ R m be a closed set. Let f ′ ∈ F be a point such that there are no other points f ∈ F which satisfy the following two conditions
• f j ≥ f ′ j for all j = 1, . . . , m, and
The Pareto boundary F ′ ⊂ F is the subset constituted by all the points f ′ . A point f ′′ ∈ F belongs to the weak Pareto boundary F ′′ of the set F if there are no points f ∈ F such that all coordinates of f are greater than the respective coordinates of f ′′ .
Finally, let us recall a helpful statement from the convex analysis.
Proposition 1. Let F be a bounded convex subset of R m and F ′ be the (weak ) Pareto boundary of F . Then for any point f 0 ∈ F ′ there is a linear function ℓ(f ) = d 1 f 1 + · · · + d m f m with positive (resp., nonnegative) coefficients d j such that ℓ achieves its maximum on F at f 0 . The converse is also true: any point f 00 ∈ F \ F ′ is not a point of maximum on F for any linear function with positive (resp., nonnegative) coefficients.
Eligible and uneligible candidates
Let a profile u of the preferences be fixed. Suppose that the winners are determined by a de Borda's rule β s from some fixed set β of these rules, but we do not know which particular scoring s will be used. Now we want to predict which candidates a ∈ A can win by a rule β s ∈ β assigned to some scoring s (these candidates are eligible w.r.t. this set of rules β) and which candidates definitely can not win for any β s ∈ β (we call them uneligible w.r.t. this set of rules).
We claim that the set of eligible candidates can be found in two important cases (see Theorems 2 and 3) without knowing beforehand the scoring s.
Suppose a profile u is fixed and a is a candidate. The following procedure allows to obtain the score vector r(a) for a using the profile u. By construction, the score vector r(a) has p − 1 components. The first component r 1 (a) equals the number of electors who regard a as the best. The second component r 2 (a) is equal to the number of voters for whom a has either the first or the second place in their preferences; the component r 3 (a) is equal to the number of electors having a on some of three first places, etc. Thus we obtain the score vector r(a) = (r 1 (a); r 2 (a); . . . ; r p−1 (a)) for every candidate a ∈ A. Obviously, the components of the vector r(a) are non-decreasing:
Also, we note that the score vector r(a) is found without knowing the scoring s.
Consider the set R ⊂ R p−1 that consists of p score vectors r(a) for all candidates a ∈ A. Next, find the Pareto boundary R ′ of the convex hull conv R of R. Now we formulate the main result of this article. Theorem 2 contains the criterion of eligibility of a given candidate by de Borda's rules with strict scorings.
Theorem 2. Suppose a profile u is fixed. Consider the set β of all de Borda's rules β s with the strict scorings s such that
Let a ∈ A be a candidate and r(a) be the score vector for a. Then the candidate a is eligible w.r.t. the set of rules β if and only if r(a) ∈ R ′ , where R ′ is the Pareto boundary of the convex hull conv R of the set R = {r(a j ), a j ∈ A, j = 1 . . . p}.
Proof. According to Remark 1, we suppose that s 0 = 0. Let us show that if a ∈ β s (u) with some scoring s such that inequalities (3) hold, then r(a) ∈ R ′ . Let the differences between the scores be
Now we analyze the summands that contribute to the de Borda estimate B s (a). The candidate a has the first place in preferences of r 1 (a) voters and hence obtains r 1 (a) · s p−1 points. Next, r 2 (a) − r 1 (a) voters put the candidate a on the second place, therefore a obtains (r 2 (a) − r 1 (a)) · s p−2 more points. Similarly, for the kth place in the preferences of (r k (a) − r k−1 (a)) voters the candidate a obtains (r k (a) − r k−1 (a)) · s p−k points in the sum B s (a), here k = 1, 2, . . . , p − 1. Recall that the last place results in no points since s 0 = 0.
By construction, the estimate B s (a) is the sum of points obtained by a:
. (4) Thus we obtain the formula for the de Borda estimate with the scoring s (see [1, Ch. 9] ). For a ∈ β s (u), the sum in (4) Conversely, suppose r(a) ∈ R ′ ∩ R. By Proposition 1, we can find a system of positive coefficients d p−k such that the linear function ℓ(r) with these coefficients has a maximum on R ′ (and, consequently, on R) at the point r(a). Using these coefficients, we construct the scoring s = (s 0 ; s 1 ; . . . ; s p−1 ) by setting s 0 = 0,
. . . Then from Eq. (4) it follows that the sum B s (a) achieves its maximum at a ∈ A and therefore a ∈ β s (u).
Obviously, we can modify slightly the assumptions of Theorem 2 and consider a wider set of de Borda's rules, namely, the set β ′ of rules β s with the scorings s that satisfy condition (2) but may not satisfy (3). Then, using Proposition 1 again, we obtain Theorem 3. Fix a profile u and consider the set β ′ of all de Borda's rules β s with the scorings s that satisfy condition (2). Find the score vectors r(x) for all candidates x ∈ A and consider the set R that consists of all vectors r(x). Let R ′′ be the weak Pareto boundary of the convex hull of R. Then any candidate a such that r(a) ∈ R ′′ is eligible w.r.t. this set of voting rules, and only these candidates are eligible. The Pareto boundary of the set R = {r(a); r(b); r(c)} contains all the three vectors r(a), r(b), and r(c), but only r(a) and r(c) belong to the sets R ′ and R ′′ (see Fig. 1 ). Hence only a and c can be the winners by some of the generalized de Borda rules. The vector r(b) is Pareto optimal, but none of the linear functions ℓ(r 1 ; r 2 ) = d 2 r 1 + d 1 r 2 with positive or nonnegative coefficients d 1 and d 2 achieves its maximum on R at the 2 Clearly, since R ∩ R ′ is a part of the Pareto boundary of R (and R ∩ R ′′ is a part of the weak Pareto boundary of R), the reasoning of [1] is correct in one direction. Namely, any winner a by some rule β s has the (weak) Pareto optimal (i. e., belonging to the (weak) Pareto boundary of R) score vector r(a). But, contrary to [1] , not every candidate a having the (weak) Pareto optimal score vector r(a) can win by some voting rule β s . point r(b). Therefore the candidate b is uneligible neither w.r.t. the set β nor w.r.t. the set β ′ : there is no rule β s such that b is a winner.
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